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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1993 Supp). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct in ruling that the "sudden and 
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion found in 
Omaha Indemnity's Comprehensive General Liability Policy is 
unambiguous and that "sudden" has a temporal aspect of 
abruptness? 
Standard of Review 
Since the trial court heard testimony on Omaha Indemnity 
Company's ("Omaha") Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, it entered judgment in 
conformance with the evidence presented, and issued Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in accordance with a 
Memorandum Decision. (R. 1891-1892.) An Order was entered 
granting judgment in favor of Chicago Insurance Company 
("Chicago") that incorporated by reference the Findings of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law and the Entry of Judgment entered on 
behalf of Omaha (R. 1936-1937), while an order granting partial 
summary judgment was entered in favor of Utah Property and 
Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (the "Guaranty 
Association") on behalf of Carriers Insurance Company 
("Carriers") and summary judgment was entered in favor of Zurich 
Insurance Company ("Zurich"). (R. 1958-1960.) Therefore, the 
applicable standard of review for- either situation is set forth 
below: 
1 
Whether the terms of the contract are ambiguous is a 
question of law; the Court therefore reviews a trial court's 
conclusion under a correctness standard. Anesthesiologists 
Associates of Qgden v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 852 P.2d 1031, 
1035 (Utah App. 1993); Klas v. Van Wagoner. 829 P.2d 135, 138 
(Utah App. 1992); Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). 
On a summary judgment, the appellate court gives no 
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions. 
Nevertheless, summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party, the 
prevailing party is still entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 
1990); Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. 771 P.2d 
1100, 1102 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Was the trial court correct in holding that the release of 
gasoline from LaSal's underground pipeline was not sudden? 
Standard of Review 
A conclusion of law is reviewed by the appellate court 
"under a correction of errors standard." Barnard v. Utah State 
Bar. 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1993); Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
A summary judgment is reviewed to determine "whether there 
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is 
not, whether the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a 
2 
matter of law.H Gridlev Associates Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 828 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah App. 1992); Thornock v. Cook, 704 
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
At Trial Court. 
Omaha, the Guaranty Association, Chicago and Zurich 
(collectively referred to as the "insurers") hereby adopt and 
incorporate by reference the Statement of the Case set forth in 
Appellant's Brief, pages 3 through 9. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal only, and for the sake of 
judicial economy, the insurers hereby adopt the Statement of 
Facts set forth in LaSal's Appellant's Brief at 9 through 21, 
subject to the corrections, clarifications, and additions to the 
following pertinent numbered paragraphs. 
39. As a clarification of Dr. Pitt's testimony, insurers 
add the following: 
Dr. Pitt testified at the evidentiary hearing that the 
particular piece of pipe (plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P) exhibited the 
characteristics of general corrosion as well as pitting 
corrosion. The basic deterioration and overall rusted appearance 
of the pipe was due to general corrosion. The localized area 
where corrosion had proceeded more rapidly than other areas was 
due to pitting corrosion. (R. 3245.) Further, Dr. Pitt 
3 
testified that a mill (the thickness of the corroded metal) is 
equal to 1,000th of an inch. (R. 3236.) 
42. The following facts should be added to Appellant's 
paragraph 42 of Statement of Facts in order to clarify Dr. Pitt's 
testimony: 
Dr. Pitt offered the following testimony concerning the 
cause of the leak in the section of pipe, Exhibit 1-P: 
You see a pipe that's had extensive corrosion on 
the outside of the pipe. Could be designated as pitting 
type corrosion/ but there is also considerable general 
corrosion on it. 
Pitting corrosion is corrosion that occurs in a 
localized area, as contrasted to general corrosion over 
all the surface. 
The process that I visualize that occurred . . . 
is that the corrosion likely occurred as a result of 
what we call straight current corrosion . . . and in 
this case, the corrosion occurred in a number of 
localized areas. The corrosion proceeded to continue 
until at some point in time the metal was thin enough 
to burst suddenly from the inside pressure of the pipe. 
And in my opinion that's what caused at least one of 
the holes present. 
Simply the metal is not strong enough to hold the 
interior pressure. 
R. 3234-3235. 
43. As a clarification to Appellant's Statement of Facts 
paragraph 43, insurers add the following: 
Dr. Pitt testified as follows: 
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If the pipe were not under pressure, I believe the leak 
would have also been sudden because at one instance 
it's there and then the next instance it's not there 
and then it's there. 
R. 3238. In Dr. Pitt's opinion, whether due to a corrosion 
failure or a failure due to an accident such as a backhoe 
striking a pipe, every failure would be considered sudden. 
(R. 3254; 3297.) 
44. In addition and in clarification to the limited facts 
set forth in Appellant's Statement of Facts paragraph 449 
insurers add the following: 
Following the exchange set forth in Appellant's Brief 
between Dr. Alex and LaSal's counsel, Dr. Alex testified that he 
did not consider the leak in this case sudden. He further opined 
that the first movement of two or three molecules did not 
encompass a sudden failure. (R. 3290.) Dr. Alex testified that 
the initial release of gasoline from inside a pipe that has 
failed due to corrosion would be "in the form of very minute 
amounts, a few atoms, osmotic, for all intents and purposes." 
(R. 3271.) After the first transgression of fluid in the form of 
atoms, "the first indication would be a slight wetting of the 
surface on the outside [of the pipe] in line with these thread 
roots." (Id.) In his opinion, this type of leak typically would 
progress from simply moisture on the outside to drops forming in 
a matter of days to weeks, and from a few drops to a gradual 
5 
trickle of gasoline over a matter of weeks to months. (R. 3271-
3272.) 
Additionally, Dr. Alex stated that there was no indication 
of an internally-caused stress fracture on the pipe because he 
would expect in the case of such stress fracture, to see a sharp 
line in the form of a crack, which was not present on Exhibit 1-
P. (R. 3277.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The pollution exclusion under the policies in question 
clearly and unambiguously precludes coverage for any discharge of 
pollutants into the environment, unless the discharge is "sudden 
and accidental." This Court has joined the other jurisdictions 
that have adopted the "more well-reasoned view" that the "sudden 
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion is 
unambiguous and has held that the word "sudden" "must have a 
temporal aspect to its meaning and not just a sense of something 
unexpected." Gridley Associates, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 
828 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah App. 1992). 
This Court reviewed the differing views of the pollution 
exclusion in Gridley and does not need to re-examine the issue 
whether "sudden" is unambiguous. "xSudden' within the vsudden 
and accidental' clause cannot be defined without reference to the 
temporal element, specifically immediacy, abruptness, and 
quickness." Id. 
6 
The Gridlev decision clearly distinguished between a 
discharge resulting from a "clean break" of a gasoline dispenser 
line that is "caused by an adjustment of the area in which it is 
in" and a break "caused by corrosion or deterioration which would 
have resulted in a gradual drip or trickle of gasoline from the 
line." Id. A clean break is deemed sudden, but a discharge of 
the type found in our case, namely a corrosively caused slow 
seepage leak, cannot be deemed sudden. 
LaSal erroneously argues that any discharge, whether 
corrosively caused or caused by a classical break in the line, is 
sudden and, therefore, within the exception to the pollution 
exclusion. These insurers respectfully submit that such an 
interpretation would eviscerate the meaning of "sudden" in the 
pollution exclusion and render it mere surplusage. Gridley 
clearly rejects this approach. Therefore, because this 
corrosively caused discharge cannot be deemed "sudden", the 
judgments dismissing LaSal's action against these insurers should 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND 
PRECLUDES COVERAGE UNDER THE INSURERS' 
POLICIES. 
7 
The pollution exclusion contained in the Omaha Policy1 
excludes coverage for: 
bodily injury or property damage arising out 
of the discharge . . . of vapors . . . fumes 
. . . liquids or gases . . . or other 
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or 
upon land . . . or other course or body of 
water; but this exclusion does not apply if 
the discharge . . . is sudden and accidental. 
R. 1898 (emphasis added). 
As acknowledged by LaSal in its Appellant's Brief, this 
Court has held in Gridlev that "sudden" in the "sudden and 
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion in a 
comprehensive general liability policy of insurance is 
unambiguous. Appellant's Brief at 23. 
A. Well established rules of contract interpretation 
require the Court to give full effect to both "sudden and 
accidental." 
Under Utah law the question of a contract's ambiguity is a 
question of law. Gridley, 828 P.2d at 526, (quoting Crowther v. 
Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983))). Insurance 
contracts are construed according to general contract principles 
and are, therefore, subject to the same rules of construction. 
Village Inn Apts, v. State Farm, 790 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1990). 
xThe policies of the other insurers joining in this brief are 
either identical to or follow form of the Omaha Policy. Therefore, 
all references to Omaha's Policy apply to all other insurers' 
policies. 
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Arnold, 114 Utah 463, 201 P.2d 475 (1949); G.G.A. Inc. v. 
Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989). 
Thus, Utah law clearly requires courts to determine the 
ordinary and plain meaning of "sudden" in the context of the 
insurance policy and in conjunction with "accidental," and not in 
the abstract. Any departure from these interpretative rules, as 
implied by LaSal's arguments, should not be countenanced. 
B. Appellant's argument that the "sudden and accidental" 
exception to the pollution exclusion is ambiguous ignores clear 
policy language. 
LaSal primarily argues that "sudden" is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable meaning. Appellant's Brief at 24. It argues 
that "sudden" can mean either "abrupt or immediate" or 
"unexpected." Id. LaSal urges the Court to follow the cases 
that have found the exception to the pollution exclusion to be 
ambiguous and therefore, interpreted in favor of coverage. See, 
e.g., Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 
603 (1980); Clausen v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 
S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1979). Because of such alleged ambiguity, LaSal 
argues that the Court must ignore the clear terms of the 
exception to the pollution exclusion which allow coverage for 
damages arising from polluting discharges only when they are both 
sudden and accidental. LaSal's approach, while ingenious, 
violates the basic rules of Utah law which prohibits a court from 
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By their very nature, dictionaries define words in 
the abstract, whereas here, we must ascertain 
whether the word "sudden" is ambiguous in the 
context of the specific insurance policy. 
Hartford, 962 F.2d at 1489 (quoting New Castle Country, 933 F.2d 
at 1194). 
Hartford further quoted New Castle Country which ruled that 
"conflicting precedent, while relevant, did not xautomatically 
mandate a finding of ambiguity'". Hartford, 962 F.2d at 1489 
(quoting Newcastle Country at 1196). 
Recent cases in other jurisdictions support this basic rule 
of policy interpretation. The Supreme Court of Florida in 
Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., No. 
78# 293, 1993 WL 241520 (Fla. July 1, 1993)2 acknowledged that 
dictionaries may be helpful "insofar as they set forth the 
ordinary, usual meaning of words. However/ as noted in New 
Castle Country v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., dictionaries 
are ximperfect yardsticks of ambiguity.'" Id. at 9 (quoting New 
Castle Country, 933 F.2d at 1193-94). The Florida Supreme Court 
stated that its duty was "to determine whether the word %sudden' 
is ambiguous in the context of the specific insurance policy at 
issue." Id. (emphasis added). 
The existence of multiple dictionary definitions of a word 
"is not the sine qua non of ambiguity. If it were, few words 
would be unambiguous." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-0 
2A copy is attached in Appendix. 
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temporal element. Id. at 527. That conclusion is consistent 
with the general rules of contractual interpretation set forth 
above. 
This Court recognized the insightful analysis of the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts by quoting Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. 
Belleville Industries, Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555 NE.2d 568, 572 
(1990) cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992): 
For the word "sudden" to have any significant 
purpose, and not to be surplusage when used 
generally in conjunction with the word 
"accidental," it must have a temporal aspect 
to its meaning, and not just the sense of 
something unexpected. We hold, therefore, 
that when used in describing a release of 
pollutants, "sudden" in conjunction with 
"accidental" has a temporal element. The 
issue is whether the release was sudden. The 
alternative is that it was gradual. If the 
release was abrupt and also accidental, there 
is coverage for an occurrence arising out of 
the discharge of pollutants. 
Gridlev, 828 P.2d at 527. 
Thus, this Court held that it has adopted the "more well-
reasoned view of jurisdictions holding the pollution exclusion to 
be unambiguous and that sudden has a temporal element, 
Kspecifically immediacy, abruptness, and quickness.'" Id. at 
527. All other courts interpreting this exception to the 
pollution exclusion clause, applying Utah law, have reached the 
same conclusion.3 
3See Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chemical Co., 990 F.2d 
1175 (10th Cir. 1993) (affirming United States District Court for 
the District of Utah decision finding pollution exclusion 
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Judge Rokich, in the case at hand, stated in his Memorandum 
Decision that the holding in Gridlev best defines what 
constitutes a sudden and accidental discharge. He adopted the 
following language of Judge Russon from Gridley: 
[T]he terms "sudden and accidental" are 
unambiguous. As commonly used, the meaning 
of sudden combines both elements of without 
notice or warning and quick or brief in time 
. . . sudden connotes a "temporal aspect of 
immediacy, abruptness, swiftness, quickness, 
instantaneous and brevity." 
R. 1890 (quoting Gridlev, 828 P.2d at 527 (quoting U.S. Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F.Supp. 437, 446 
(D.Kan. 1990), affd. 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993))). 
Despite the fact that an ongoing controversy exists among 
different jurisdictions, the better-reasoned cases continue to 
find "sudden" in the exception to the pollution exclusion to be 
unambiguous and to require a temporal element.4 Hence, there is 
unambiguous); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(affirming United States District Court, District of Utah decision 
holding pollution exclusion unambiguous). Hartford cited the 
decision of Judge Winder of the District Court in Anaconda 
Minerals, 773 F.Supp. at 1505 n.9, noting that Judge Winder quoted 
Sharon Steel v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., no. C-87-2306 and C-
87-2311 at 28 (3rd Dist. Utah, July 20, 1988) as follows: 
"[W]ithout referring to dictionaries, case law or parol evidence, 
a reasonably prudent person would interpret vsudden' as including 
vtemporal condition of being instantaneous and abrupt'". Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co., 962 F.2d at 1490 n.7. 
4See list of cases cited in ACL Technologies, Inc. v. 
Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 22 
Cal.Rptr.2nd 206, 209-211 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1993), petition for 
review denied Cal.Rptr.2nd (Cal. 1993). 
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no reason for this Court to re-analyze this issue since that 
decision has already properly been made in Gridley in accordance 
with the principles of contractual interpretation firmly 
established by Utah case law. The trial court's judgments in our 
case on appeal were consistent with this Court's holding in 
Gridlev and should, therefore, be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT 
THE RELEASE OF THE GASOLINE FROM LASAL'S 
UNDERGROUND LINE WAS NOT SUDDEN. 
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Rokich concluded that 
Gridley, supra, Mis the case that best defines what constitutes a 
sudden and accidental discharge." (R. 1890.) He adopted 
Gridley's language that "sudden connotes a xtemporal aspect of 
immediacy, abruptness, swiftness, quickness, instantaneous and 
brevity.'" (R. 1980) (quoting Gridley, 828 P.2d at 527). The 
trial court also adopted Gridley's ruling that the "length of 
time that elapses before the leak is discovered or the amount of 
discharge does not render the fracture any less sudden," in 
situations where a discharge has a sudden inception rather than 
one which is gradual. (R. 1891.) 
It should be noted for purposes of this appeal that LaSal is 
appealing that portion of the trial court's decision that ruled 
the pollution exclusion unambiguous, as well as its finding that 
the discharge was not sudden. Insurers understand that LaSal is 
not appealing that portion of the trial court's decision holding 
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that the elapsed time between the inception of the leak and its 
discovery does not render an otherwise sudden leak any less 
sudden. Therefore, the insurers will not specifically address 
this issue, except to the extent that it relates to the 
determination of the nature of the discharge, whether sudden or 
gradual.5 
Most importantly for purposes of this appeal, the trial 
court distinguished the facts of the Gridley case from the case 
at hand. Based on the undisputed evidence established through 
extensive briefing by the parties as well as an evidentiary 
hearing involving qualified metallurgy experts, the trial court 
found that the failure of the pipe resulted from the process of 
corrosion. (R. 1899-1901.) In Gridley, the pipeline leak 
resulted from a "clean break" and was, therefore, deemed to be 
sudden. By contrast, the trial court in our case held "that a 
leak caused by corrosion is not sudden and accidental." 
(R. 1891.) Therefore, the pollution exclusion applies and 
precludes coverage for LaSal. 
Despite LaSal's attempts to characterize Gridley's 
discussions concerning the difference between a "clean break" and 
one caused by corrosion as mere "dicta"6, such comparison of the 
5This does not mean that the insurers necessarily agree with 
that premise, but rather, assert that even accepting it, they are 
nonetheless entitled to an affirmance of the trial court's judgment 
dismissing LaSal's complaint with_prejudice. 
6See Appellant's Brief at 30, 41-42. 
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differing causative processes is necessary for a full under-
standing of the holding of Gridley and should not be disregarded 
or reversed. 
In Gridley, it was uncontroverted that the "break in the 
gasoline line was a xclean break' that vwould have had to have 
been caused by an adjustment of the area in which it is in.f" 
Id. at 527. No evidence was presented to show that the leak was 
caused by corrosion or deterioration "which would have resulted 
in a gradual drip or trickle of gasoline from the line." Id. 
Thus, the court found that the "clean break certainly resulted in 
an unexpected as well as an immediate and abrupt flow of gasoline 
from the severed line" which qualified the discharge as "sudden." 
Id. 
A. Gradual is the opposite of sudden. 
This Court recognized in Gridley that for "sudden" to have 
any significance within the context of the pollution exclusion, 
it must refer to a temporal element "specifically immediacy, 
abruptness and quickness." Id. 
LaSal has attempted to restrict the meaning of "sudden" to 
the isolated moment of "initial release" while ignoring both the 
causative process and the continuation of the leak. See 
Appellant's Brief at 38. LaSal argues that because the length of 
time to discover and the volume of the release are irrelevant, 
logic dictates that the Court should only look to the very moment 
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the gasoline left the confinement of the pipe into the 
environment. Such argument is both unrealistic and useless. 
If the Court accepted LaSal's argument, the independent 
meaning of "sudden", which is the opposite of gradual, would be 
eviscerated. The Court would also be forced to disregard the 
long line of cases interpreting the pollution exclusion for both 
gasoline leaks, as well as general routine discharges. If every 
discharge were limited to a sterile analysis by characterizing 
the initial release from containment into the environment as 
sudden, every discrete release could arguably be found to be 
sudden. The only issue left to decide would be whether the 
discharge was unexpected or unintended. 
The better-reasoned cases which have addressed this question 
(most of which have been relied upon by LaSal to construct its 
arguments), distinguish between differing causes of leaks as a 
means of deciding the true nature of the leaks. Just as this 
Court in Gridley distinguished between the nature of clean breaks 
and corrosively-caused leaks in underground lines, the courts in 
other jurisdictions have uniformly utilized these distinctions in 
analyzing the suddenness of leaks as well. 
LaSal has cited Shell Oil v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 
Cal.App. 4th 715, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 815, 841-42 (1993) for the 
proposition that "sudden" refers to the commencement of a 
discharge but does not require the polluting event to terminate 
quickly. See Appellant's Brief at 33. LaSal failed, however, to 
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point out that the Shell court further stated "[i]f a sudden and 
accidental discharge continues for a long time, at some point it 
ceases to be sudden or accidental." Shell, 15 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 
842 (citing Lumbermens Mutual Cas. v. Belleville, Ind., 407 Mass. 
675, 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 n.6.)7 
Furthermore, Shell stated: 
We cannot reasonably call "sudden" a process that 
occurs slowly and incrementally over a relatively 
long time, no matter how unexpected or unintended 
the process. A "discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape" of pollutants that happens gradually and 
continuously for years is not "sudden" in the 
ordinary sense of the word. (American Motorists 
Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp. (D.Kan. 1987) 667 
F.Supp. 1423, 1428-1429, affd. (10th Cir. 1991) 
946 F.2d 1482, mod. on rehg. (10th Cir. 1991) 946 
F.2d 1489.) Thus, "sudden" necessarily contains a 
temporal element in addition to its connotation of 
the unexpected. 
Shell, 15 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 841 (citations in original). 
In a recent decision following Shell, ACL Technologies, Inc. 
v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 
22 Cal.Rptr.2nd 206 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1993), petition for 
review denied Cal.Rptr.2nd (Cal. 1993), the California 
Court of Appeals held that the pollution exclusion precluded 
7The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: 
We decline to speculate on the proper 
construction of the exception, if a release or 
discharge, initially both accidental and 
sudden, continues for an extended period. As 
the discharge or release continues, at some 
point, presumably, it would likely cease to be 
accidental or sudden (even in the sense of 
unexpected). 
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coverage for damages incurred in clean-up of pollutants which 
leaked from rusted and corroded underground storage tanks. After 
performing a concise but thorough review of the issue surrounding 
the exception to the pollution exclusion, the court ruled that 
when applying the framework of rules of contract interpretation 
similar to those utilized by Utah courts, 
there is no way that we could come to any 
other conclusion than that reached in the 
Shell Oil decision: that "sudden and 
accidental" language in the CGL 
[comprehensive general liability policy] 
pollution exclusion does not allow for 
coverage for gradual pollution. 
Id. at 212. 
Addressing the very issue before this Court, the court in 
ACL Technologies stated: 
Giving sudden a meaning independent of 
accidental, therefore, requires giving it a 
meaning with a temporal aspect - immediacy, 
quickness or abruptness - that does not allow 
it to cover events, such as happened in this 
case - that occurred gradually. We therefore 
conclude, in the context of this case, that 
"sudden and accidental" unambiguously does 
not include gradual pollution. 
Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 
Even if the Court were to conclude that the phrase "sudden 
and accidental" is ambiguous, the trial court's judgments in our 
case, as in ACL Technologies, would have to be affirmed for this 
reason: "[W]hatever vsudden' means, it does not mean gradual. 
The ordinary person would never think that something which 
happens gradually also happened suddenly. The words are 
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antonyms." Id. at 215. Because gradual is the opposite of 
sudden and because a reasonable and objective person with 
ordinary understanding would not expect sudden to cover gradual 
pollution, sudden can never mean both "unexpected and gradual." 
See, Id. at 215 n.40 & 216 n.42 for insightful and entertaining 
illustrations supporting this argument. 
Even those cases cited by LaSal which seemingly support its 
position, in fact illustrate the insurers' analytical approach. 
One cannot determine the nature of the discharge by sterilely 
isolating the moment of initial release. 
In order to understand the reasoning of the court in Wagner 
v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co.. 427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis.App. 1988), 
review denied, 436 N.W.2d 30 (Wis. 1988), relied upon heavily by 
LaSal, one must understand the facts. The parties agreed at 
oral argument that although the exact cause of the leak was 
unknown, the insurer, Milwaukee Mutual, conceded "that in all 
probability the leak resulted from a crack in a pipe damaged when 
cement footings for the canopy were poured on it, and that this 
crack occurred immediately." Id. at 855 n.2 (emphasis added). 
The Wisconsin Appellate Court rejected the insurer's 
argument that the discharge was not sudden because the discharge 
accumulated over a period of three years. The court reasoned 
that the initial discharge of the gasoline was sudden. The 
gasoline leak began immediately after it was cracked in 1981 and 
continued leaking until it was discovered in 1984. Therefore, 
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according to the court, the length of time before the leak was 
discovered was irrelevant as it related to the issue of 
suddenness. Id, at 857. 
Obviously, the court focused on the nature of the initial 
discharge and reasoned that because the leak was caused by an 
immediate breaking of the pipe with a single event, as in 
Gridley, rather than by a slow, ongoing process of corrosion, it 
qualified as a sudden leak. The court also emphasized that the 
sudden status of the leak would only be maintained if the 
continuing discharge remained undiscovered. Id. at 857-858. 
Likewise, LaSal has selectively cited Goodman v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 412 Mass. 807, 593 N.E.2d 233 (1992). Therein, the 
parties agreed that an underground gasoline storage tank had been 
leaking for 18 months prior to its discovery and removal. 
Summary judgment was granted when the trial court found that the 
release over 18 months was too lengthy to have been considered 
sudden. Id. at 235. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded for the reason that "the record in this case did not 
permit an informed resolution whether the leak in question was 
abrupt, and therefore, does not establish enough facts to warrant 
decision on the "suddenness" issue." Id. at 235-236. The court 
reaffirmed the holding in Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville 
Ind., 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.W.2d 568 (1990) cert, denied, U.S. 
, 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992), which held that "the abruptness of the 
commencement of the release or discharge of the pollutant is the 
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crucial element in determining whether an event qualifies as 
^sudden'." Goodman, 559 N.E.2d at 235 (quoting Lumbermens, 555 
N.E.2d at 572). The Massachusetts court, however, did not 
exclusively restrict its analysis to the very moment of the 
liquid's discharge into the outside environment, as proposed by 
LaSal. In fact, the court demonstrated a more meaningful 
approach as follows: 
While the cause of the release does not 
determine whether the exception to the 
pollution exclusion is applicable, it may 
well be informative in deciding whether the 
release was abrupt. For example, a sudden 
cause (like a pile driven into a gasoline 
tank), or the sudden development of a 
condition (like a ground shift that ruptures 
piping) might guide the decision whether a 
given release of pollutants was due to a 
momentary event, and therefore, was abrupt. 
Id. 
In concluding that insufficient evidence had been developed 
at trial to determine the cause of the leak, the Goodman court 
quoted from plaintiff's expert who opined that the discharge was 
not the result of a gradual leak of gasoline from the tank over 
an indeterminant period of time, but was an abrupt discharge. Id. 
at 236. Nevertheless, the court noted that the expert's 
observations provided no clear explanation of the source of the 
hole in the offending tank "or whether the release of pollutants 
came about as a result of a condition that developed so rapidly 
it could properly be described as. a momentary event." Id. 
(citing Gridley). Furthermore, there was evidence that gasoline 
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also appeared to have been released from a siphon or riser pipe 
connecting the underground tank, and conflicting testimony 
existed concerning the extent of the hole in the defective tank. 
Id. 
As a final illustration of the differing treatment accorded 
by courts to pipes that leak as a result of a "sudden event 
versus a slowly developing, gradual leak," the Goodman court 
stated: 
The leak of gasoline from tank no. 2 may have 
begun slowly from a crack or small hole in 
the tank brought about by its aging, and then 
increased over time as the crack or hole 
widened. This type of release probably would 
not constitute a "sudden" event within the 
exception to the pollution clause. However, 
it is also possible that the discharge of 
pollutants occurred as the result of a sudden 
cause or rapidly developing condition . . . 
but, until all of the circumstances of the 
release in this case are fully developed, no 
adequate determination can be made as to 
whether the "sudden and accidental" exception 
is applicable. 
Id. at 236 (emphasis added). 
The Goodman decision is consistent with Wagner and Gridlev 
in differentiating between a gradually developing leak through 
corrosion and one which is abrupt and immediate, arising from a 
sudden event causing a "clean break." 
Another case cited by LaSal, Petr-all Petroleum Corp. v. 
Firemans Ins. Co., 593 N.Y.S.2d 693 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1993) ruled 
that an insurer had a duty to defend the owner of a gasoline 
station which had leaking underground gasoline pipes, based on 
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the broad duty to defend, since the complaint by a third-party 
adjacent homeowner could be interpreted "to allege an accidental 
and unexpected leak from a subsurface pipe or tank that continued 
undetected for a period of time, an event both sudden and 
accidental . . . ." Id, at 695. The papers submitted 
demonstrated that the cause of the leak may have been a break in 
the pipeline when a customer drove away from a dispenser before 
removing the nozzle from her car. Id. at 695. 
The court stated that the insurer, by relying upon this 
specific event as a basis for dismissal, "implicitly conceded 
that the complaint" may be interpreted as alleging a sudden and 
accidental leak. Under these circumstances, rather than a leak 
resulting "from a repeated or continuous business operation," the 
court found a duty to defend. Id. 
There is no evidence in our case to indicate a sudden and 
accidental break of the pipeline in question. Rather, the leak 
arose from the gradual corrosive process and continued its slow 
progression over time until its discovery. (R. 1899, H 23; R. 
1901, 1F 10.) 
Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co., 538 
N.Y.S.2d 630 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1989), cited by LaSal, also presents 
facts that are inapposite to our case on appeal. Colonie 
involved claims for coverage in the face of the pollution 
exclusion where a discharge of waste oil into the environment was 
caused when an underground pipe in a waste oil containment unit 
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"cracked." The court noted that the record was absent of any 
suggestion "that plaintiff was aware of either the crack or the 
discharge until waste oil was discovered in the ground water of 
adjacent property." The court also noted that routine 
maintenance or inspection would presumably not have revealed the 
leak (unlike a gasoline tank which is regularly inventoried). 
Again, because of the inconclusive nature of the type of 
discharge at its inception# the court ruled in favor of the 
insured. 
The cases discussed above and cited by LaSal demonstrate the 
differentiation between a gradual leak resulting from corrosion 
and a sudden leak caused by an abrupt or immediate event. Sudden 
is the opposite of gradual. In order to give effect to the 
meaning of "sudden" in applying it to the facts of our case, the 
commencement of the leak at the LaSal Station must be analyzed in 
its context. Such analysis clearly demonstrates that it resulted 
from a gradual, on-going process of corrosion and continued as a 
slow, gradually developing leak thereafter. On that basis, the 
trial court correctly held it to be gradual and non-sudden. 
(See R. 1901.) 
B. The evidence establishes that the inception of the leak 
resulted from corrosion and that its commencement was gradual and 
not sudden. 
LaSal's expert, EarthFax Engineering, Inc., has concluded 
that the onset of the gasoline release occurred sometime between 
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February, 1983 and September, 1984. See Appellant's Brief at 17 
(citing R. 1655-1656). The pipe was not uncovered and removed 
until approximately January 30, 1986, when the leak was located 
and repaired. (R. 3223.) 
LaSal's metallurgy expert, Dr. Pitt, in his report drafted 
July 15, 1992, submitted as Exhibit 3-P at the evidentiary 
hearing (R. 1885), stated that M[v]isual observation of the 
coupling shows extensive pitting and corrosion present on its 
outside surface." (Emphasis added.) Further, Dr. Pitt stated 
that "[c]orrosion of the pipe wall produced a situation where the 
metal thickness at the thread roots was too small to hold the 
interior pressure." Id. Dr. Pitt roughly calculated that 
corrosion had gradually proceeded over time to the point where 
the pipe at the place of failure was "about 1.1 mills, at the 
time of failure." (R. 3236.) A millimeter is a thousandth of an 
inch. Dr. Pitt admitted that 1 millimeter would be in the 
magnitude of a sheet of paper or even thinner.8 (R. 3253.) 
Dr. Franklin Alex, expert metallurgist presented on behalf 
of Omaha, agreed with Dr. Pitt that the pipe was thinned to the 
point of failure as a result of general and pitting corrosion. 
In fact, their only disagreement centered on their interpretation 
of whether the actual discharge of the product from the pipe 
resulting from corrosion was sudden or gradual. 
8Dr. Alex stated that 1.1 millimeters is about "half the 
width" of a piece of paper. (R. 3278, 3287.) 
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It was Dr. Pitt's opinion that there could not be anything 
other than a sudden failure of a pipe due to corrosion because, 
in his mind, at one moment the pipe is not open, and at the next 
moment the product breaks through its containment. (See R. 3242, 
3253-3254.) In fact, when questioned by Judge Rokich directly, 
Dr. Pitt stated that "the actual happening is where there's a 
hole that - at one instant there's a hole and before that there's 
no hole and that's my definition of sudden." (R. 3297.) In 
order to seek a clarification of his testimony, the following 
dialogue then took place between Judge Rokich and Dr. Pitt: 
The Court: Let's go back over that so I can-
Witness Pitt: Kinetics means how fast 
something occurs, and that would be how fast 
fluid flows through the hole. I don't care 
how fast it flows through the hole. 
The Court: So it's just the time that the 
penetration occurs? 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Court: As the suddenness of the break? 
Witness Pitt: Yes. 
The Court: Okay. And you're saying that's 
not the case. 
R. 3297. 
In short, Dr. Pitt utilized a metaphysical approach and 
found that the first molecular movement of liquid from inside of 
metal, regardless of how badly corroded it might be, to outside 
of metal, is always sudden. 
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Dr. Alex, in harmony with Dr. Pitt, also believed that the 
failure was caused by general and pitting corrosion (R. 3266), 
and that the pipe failed in at least five areas coincident with 
the thread roots. (R. 3266.) Dr. Alex opined as to the cause of 
the failures as follows: 
They were caused by general and pitting 
corrosion. There are then the various 
indications. Here are the various degrees of 
penetration. You've got anywhere from just 
going through to the point where the 
corrosion products are still in the 
penetration, but you can see the inside 
surface to the point where you have the 
complete perforation in an elongated 
perforation. 
R. 3269. 
Dr. Alex explained corrosion to be a process that any 
metallic substance undergoes when exposed to the environment. 
The iron pipe starts corroding and forming oxides which are 
represented by the brown or rusting areas on the pipe. (R. 1885, 
Exhibit 1-P; see, also, Exhibits 4-D, the photograph of the 
pipe.) Corrosion gradually progresses at different rates in 
different areas. The faster corroding areas form pits, until 
finally the material is eaten away to the point where the metal 
is thinnest, which, in LaSal's case, was in the thread roots. 
(R. 3270.) 
According to Dr. Alex, the areas of corroded perforation 
generally still have a coating of rust on the inside and outside 
and, where underground, are retained by soil and other material. 
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Therefore, "the first transgression of fluid would be in the form 
of very minute amounts, a few atoms, osmotic, for all intents and 
'purposes." (R. 3271.) There would initially be a "slight 
wetting of the surface on the outside in line with these thread 
roots" that would progress at some point in the future to more 
perceptible liquid on the outside of the pipe. Id. As explained 
by Dr. Alex, the time frame involved from the first osmotic 
moisture on the outside, to the formation of drops outside the 
pipe could take from days to weeks. It would take from weeks to 
months for the few drops to slowly progress to a gradual trickle 
of product through the corroded openings. (R. 3272.) 
Despite LaSal's interpretation that the final push through 
the corrosively-thinned membrane was the result of a "sudden 
impulse of internal pressure," Dr. Alex stated that the discharge 
was not due to a sudden failure of the pipe. He pointed out that 
the holes in the pipe were "eaten away on both sides" and showed 
signs of gradually enlarging pitting areas that over time would 
continue to form a larger hole in surrounding areas. (R. 3283.) 
Furthermore, the photograph of the pipe (Exhibit 4-P) portrays an 
area that is covered over with corrosive products that 
demonstrates "various degrees of penetration . . . and you still 
have . . . some areas where you can see the corroding products, 
but the area is not penetrated yet." (R. 3283.) 
In summary, Dr. Alex agreed if you narrowly define sudden as 
"the first time one molecule of water moves through that wall 
31 
section" then the leak would be considered sudden. However, he 
stated that he didn't "think that one molecule or two molecules 
or three molecules encompasses a sudden failure from a practical 
standpoint." (R. 3290.) 
The approach proffered by LaSal through its expert, Dr. 
Pitt, takes an unnecessarily restrictive and unrealistic point of 
view in determining "sudden" for purposes of the pollution 
exclusion. Under this analysis, all discharges will be subjected 
to this microscopic analysis and found to be sudden. Whether 
caused by an abrupt breaking of the line by a backhoe, or arising 
from a gradual corrosive process, all leaks, and for that matter, 
all discharges would be considered sudden. This analysis would 
have the same effect as defining sudden to mean "unexpected and 
unintended." The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit rejected this approach: 
We are not convinced that the discharges in 
this case were brief or momentary. Ray has 
argued that each release was sudden, when 
viewed in isolation. But under this theory, 
all releases would be sudden; one cannot 
always isolate a specific moment at which 
pollution actually enters the environment. 
Rather than pursuing such metaphysical 
concepts, we choose to recognize the reality 
of Sea Ray's actions in this case. 
Ray Industries. Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 
768-769 (6th Cir. 1992). 
There is no dispute between either of the experts, nor in 
the record, with the fact that the leak in question resulted from 
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a long-term process of corrosion. The only disagreement between 
the experts is the legal conclusion each draws from such 
evidence. To accept LaSal's premise that all leaks are sudden 
eviscerates the meaning of sudden, in violation of the general 
rules of contractual interpretation firmly established in Utah 
law. For this reason, insurers urge this Court to affirm the 
trial court's judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in applying the well-reasoned 
decision of Gridlev to the facts of this case in finding that the 
pollution exclusion in the Omaha policy precluded coverage for 
any of the underlying claims against LaSal. The "sudden and 
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion is unambiguous. 
This Court does not need to re-examine the issue of whether 
sudden is unambiguous. "Sudden" cannot be defined, within the 
exception to the pollution exclusion, without referring to "the 
temporal element, specifically immediacy, abruptness, and 
quickness." Gridlev. 828 P.2d at 527. 
The record clearly establishes, without dispute, that the 
leak in question was formed as a result of an ongoing, gradual 
process of corrosion. Under such facts, Gridley requires that 
this leak be found to be gradual, not sudden, in its inception. 
In order to find this leak sudden, this Court would have to 
abandon all logic and accept an unworkable and unrealistic 
analytical framework. 
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Clearly, this leak developed gradually, and its commencement 
was gradual. Thus, the pollution exclusion requires this Court 
to affirm the trial court's dismissal of LaSal's complaint 
against all the insurers. 
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Supreme Court of Jf lorftra 
No. 79,293 
OIMMITT CHEVROLET! INC., at al., 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SOUTHEASTERN FIDELITY INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, Appellee. 
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED 
[July 1, 1993) 
PER CURIAM. 
This cause is before the Court on the following certified 
question of law from the United States Court of Appeals in 
Industrial Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, 
Inc._, 935 F.2d 240 (11th Cir. 1991)1 
WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE POLLUTION 
EXCLUSION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY PRECLUDES 
COVERAGE TO ITS INSURED FOR LIABILITY FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION THAT OCCURRED IN 
THIS CASE. 
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, | 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. See also I 
25.Q31, Fla. Stat. (1991)) Fla. R. App. P. 9.ISO. 
The court of appeals set forth the following statement of 
facte and procedural history of this case for our consideration. 
The following facts, taken from the 
district court's opinion, Industrial Indem. Ins. 
Co. v. Crown Auto-Dealerships/ 731 F. Supp. 
1517, 1518-19 (M.D. Fla. 19$0), are undisputed. 
Appellants Dimmltt Chevrolet, Inc. and Larry 
Dimmltt Cadillac, Inc. ("Dimmltt") operated two 
automobile dealerships. From 1974 through 1979, 
Dimmltt sold the used crankcase oil generated by 
its business to Peak Oil Company ("Peak*). From 
1954 to 1979, Peak recycled the oil at its plant 
in Hillsborough County, Florida for sale ae used 
oil. 
In 1983, the Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") determined that Peak's oil 
operations had resulted in extensive soil and 
groundwater pollution at and around the plant 
site. Much of this pollution resulted from 
Peak's placement of waste oil sludge in unllned 
storage ponds. Chemicals from the sludge then 
leached into the soil and groundwater. Some of 
the pollution also derived from oil spills and 
leaks at the site, including a 1978 incident in 
which.a dike collapsed and allowed oily 
wastewater to be released from a holding pond, 
and the occasional runoff of contaminated 
rainwater. 
In July 1987, the EPA notified appellants 
that a release of hazardous substances had 
occurred at the Peak site and that appellants 
were potentially responsible parties ("PRP") for 
the costs of investigating and cleaning up the 
pollution.• This liability is imposed, pursuant 
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to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1900 
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. g 9607 et «eq.f on anyone 
who venerates, transports, or~Hlsposes of 
hazardous substances. In February 1999, Dimmitt 
and other PRPs entered into two administrative 
orders with EPA. Without conceding liability, 
appellants agreed to undertake remedial measures 
at the Peak site. 
Appellee Southeastern Fidelity Insurance 
Corporation ("Southeastern") provided . 
comprehensive general liability ("CGL*) 
insurance coverage to Dimmitt from 1972 through 
1900. The policy covered Dimmitt 
for all sums which the INSURED shall become 
legally obligated to pay an DAMAGES because 
of A. BODILY INJURY or B. PROPERTY DAMAGE
 # 
to which this insurance applies, caused by 
an occurrence, and the Company shall have 
the right and duty to defend any suit 
against the INSURED seeking DAMAGES on 
account of such BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY 
DAMAGE, even if any of the allegations of 
the suit are groundless. . . . 
An "occurrence" is defined by the policy as 
an accident Including continuous or 
repeated exposure to conditions, which 
result in BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY DAMAGE 
neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the INSURED. . . • 
However, the policy excluded coverage for 
BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY DAMAGE arising 
out of the discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, 
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids, 
or gases, waste materials . • • into or 
upon land, the atmosphere or any water 
course or body of water; but this 
exclusion..does not apply if such discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and 
accidental. . . . 
In October I960, Southeastern filed a 
declaratory judgment action against Dimmitt, 
seeking a declaration by the district court that 
Southeastern owed no duty to defend or indemnify 
Dimmitt under the CGL policy. Dimmitt filed a 
counterclaim seeking a contrary declaration. 
Both parties subsequently filed motions for 
summary judgment. The district court.granted 
summary judgment in favor of Southeastern, 
reasoning that the pollution exclusion was not 
ambiguous and that the word "sudden" should be 
given a temporal meaning. Industrial Indem. 
Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, 731 F. Supp. 
1517 (M.D. Fla. 1990).Accordingly, the 
district court ruled that the pollution at the 
peak site occurred over a period of years and 
therefore could not be considered "sudden." The 
district court subsequently denied without 
opinion Dimmitt's motion to alter or amend the 
judgment. 
Crown Auto, 935 F.2d at 241-42 (footnotes omitted). 
As noted by the court of appeals, Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. 
(Dimmitt) was not the actual cause of the pollution damage at 
issue. Its liability, however, is not in dispute in this case. 
The issue before us Is whether Dimmitt's comprehensive liability 
Insurance policy was intended to cover hazardous* waste pollution 
under the circumstances set forth in the court of appeals' 
opinion. The question turns bn the meaning of the term "sudden 
and accidental4 within the pollution exclusion'clause of 
Dimmitt's policy. 
Dimmitt asserts that the term "sudden and accidental" is 
ambiguous because it is subject to multiple definitions. Thus, 
because ambiguous terms within an insurance policy should be 
construed in favor of the insured, the policy should be construed 
in Dimmitt's favor. Dimmitt argues that the word "sudden" does 
not have a temporal meaning and that the term was Intentionally 
P 
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written io as to provide coverage for unexpected and unintended 
pollution discharge. 
Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corporation (Southeastern) 
contends that the clause excludes coverage for all pollution 
except when the discharge or dispersal of the pollutant occurs 
abruptly and accidentally. As such, Southeaster* asserts that it 
had no duty to defend or indemnify Dimmltt because the pollution 
by the actual polluter, Peak Oil Company (Peak), was gradual and 
occurred over a period of several years. 
Both sides also argue that the drafting history of 
pollution exclusion clauses favors their respective positions. 
In this regard, it should be noted that comprehensive general 
liability (CGL) policies are standard insurance policlss 
developed by Insurance Industry trade associations, and these 
policies are the primary form of commercial insurance coverage 
obtained by businesses throughout the country. Before 1966, the 
standard CGL policy covered only property and personal Injury 
damage that was caused by "accident." Broadwell Realty Servs., 
Inc. v. Fidelity a Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 84 (H.J. Super. Ct. 
1987). in 1966 the Insurance industry switched to "occurrence-
bated" policies in which the term "occurrence" was defined as 
*'«n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions, which results.in bodily injury or property damage 
neither expected nor Intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.'" Broadwell, 528 A.2d at 84 (quoting 3 Rowland H. Long, 
The Law of Liability Insurance App»S3 (1966)). Beginning in 
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1970, the pollution exclusion clause at issue in this case was 
added to the standard policy. Finally, the policy was again 
changed in 1984 by the addition of what has been called an 
"absolute exclusion clause," which totally excludes coverage for 
pollution clean-up costs that arise from governmental directives. 
Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability Insurance Law 161 
(1991). 
Dimmltt argues that because many state insurance 
commissioners approved the 1970 addition of the pollution, 
exclusion clause without ordering a reduction in premiums, this 
indicates that the clause did little more than clarify coverage. 
Southeastern counters by saying that the reason there was no 
premium reduction in 1970 was because there had been no premium 
Increase when the coverage was expanded in 1966 to cover 
occurrences. Both parties also rely on conflicting statements 
made by insurance representatives who had appeared before state 
Insurance commissions, as well as statements made by other 
insurance experts. 
The policy language at issue here has been the subject of 
extensive litigation throughout the United States. There is 
substantial support for both parties' positions. On the one 
hand, the supreme courts of Colorado, Georgia, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin have found the pollution exclusion clause to be 
-6-
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ambiguous. in reaching their conclusions, these courts refer to 
the varying dictionary definitions of the word "sudden." They 
are also persuaded by the drafting history that the words "sudden 
and accidental" were intended to mean "unexpected and 
unintended." 
On the other hand, the supreme courts of Massachusetts, 
Michigan, North Carolina, and Ohio have held that the word 
"sudden" has a temporal context.* Therefore, when the word 
"sudden" is combined with the word 'accidental,* the clause meana 
abrupt and unintended. A majority of federal courts of appeal 
appear to have adopted this view in construing policies in states 
in which the supreme court of that state has not yet set forth 
Its position. 
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 911 P.2d 1003 
(Colo. 199U; Clauaaan y. Aetna Casualty ft Sur. Co., 380 S.£.2d 
686 (Ga. 1999)1 Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992)? just v. Land Reclamation Ltd., 456 
N.w.2d 970 (Wis. 1990). 
2 
Lumbermen? Mut. Casualty v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.B.2d 
56B (Mass. 1990); Upjohn v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N*W.2d 
392 (Mich. 1991); Waste Management of the Carolina's, Inc. v. 
Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986); Hybud Equip. Corp. 
v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.B.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992). 
•« • 
E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 957 r.2d 
11 jj (4th Cir.)(construing New Jersey law), cert, denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 78, 121 L. Ed. 2d 42 {1992); Aetna Casualty 6 Sur. Co. v. 
General Dynamics Corp., 9*8 F.2d 707 (dth Cir. 1992)(construing 
Missouri lawn Hartford Accident ft Indem. Co* v. United States 
Fidelity ft GuarTTo., 962 F.2d 1484 (lbth Cir.)(construing Utah 
law), cert, denied, "113 S. Ct. 411, 121 L. Ed, 2d 335 (1992); 
Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assoca., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 
199U(construing Pennsylvania law); A. Johnson a Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty ft Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991)(construing Maine 
-7-
He are persuaded that the federal district judge properly 
construed Southeastern*s pollution exclusion clause. The 
ordinary and common usage of the term "sudden" Includes a 
temporal aspect with a sense of immediacy or abruptness. As 
stated by the court in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake 
Insurance Co., 597 H.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ohio 1992)i 
As it la most commonly used, "sudden* means 
happening quickly, abruptly, or without prior 
notice. This la the plain and ordinary meaning 
of the word, and the context in which it is 
employed does not indicate that it should be 
given any other meaning. 
See Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 480 N.w.2d 
368 (Minn. App. 1992)(sudden meana the incident at issue occurred 
relatively quickly rather than gradually over a long period of 
time). 
law); New York v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir. 
1991)(construing New York law); FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty ft 
Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.)(construing Michigan law), cert, 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 284, 112 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1990); United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 875 F.2d 868 (6th 
Cir. 1989)(construing Tennessee law by affirming without opinion 
693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988)); United States Fidelity ft 
Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc._, 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 
198d)(construing Kentucky law); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. 
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d io (1st Cir. 
1984)(construing New Hampshire law). Contra CPC Int'l, Inc. v. 
Northbrook Excess ft Surplus Ins. Co., $62 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 
1992)(also construing New Jersey law); New Castle County v. 
Hartford Accident ft Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 
1991)(construing Delaware law). 
S 
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Dimmltt points to dictionary definitions of-"sudden" which 
also Include the meaning of "happening or coming unexpectedly." 
Dictionaries are helpful insofar as they set forth the ordinary, 
usual meaning of words. However, aa noted in New Castle County 
v. Hartford Accident ft Indemnity Co.# dictionaries are •imperfect 
yardsticks of ambiguity." 933 F.2d at 1193-94. Our duty is to 
determine whether the word "sudden" is ambiguous in the context 
of the specific Insurance policy at issue. 
The use of the word "sudden" can connote, a sense of the 
unexpected. However, rather than standing alone in the pollution 
exclusion clause, it is an integral part of the conjunctive 
phrase "sudden and accidental." The term accidental is generally 
understood to mean unexpected or unintended. Hartford Accident ft 
Indem. Co. v. United States fidelity ft Guar. Co.. 962 F.2d 1484 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 411, 121 L. Ed. 2d 335 
(1992). Therefore, to construe sudden also to mean unintended 
and unexpected would render the words sudden and accidental 
entirely redundant. This analysis is well stated in Northern 
Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc.t 
See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause 
Through the Looking Glass,• 74 Geo. L.J. 1237, 1240 (1986), in 
which the author laments that some courts have "ignored the 
Insurers' Intent and distorted the phrase 'sudden and accidental' 
beyond recognition. " He states that "courts have extended the 
coverage of policies containing the pollution exclusion 'to mean 
just what they choose it to mean.'" Id. 
"To read 'sudden and accidental' to mean only 
unexpected and unintended is to rewrite the 
policy by excluding one important pollution 
coveraoe requirement—abruptness of the 
pollution discharge. The very use of the words 
'sudden and accidental1 reveal (sic] a clear 
Intent to define the words differently, stating 
two separate requirements. Reading 'sudden' in 
its context, i.e. joined by the word 'and'.to 
the word 'accident', the inescapable conclusion 
is that 'sudden', even if including the concept 
of unexpectedness, also adds an additional 
element because 'unexpectedness' is already 
expressed by '.accident.' This additional 
element is the temporal meaning of sudden, i.e. 
abruptness or brevity. To define sudden as 
meaning only unexpected or unintended, and 
therefore as a mere restatement of accidental, 
would render the suddenness requirement mere 
surplusage." 
942 F.2d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 1991)(quoting Lower Paxton Township v. 
United States Fidelity ft Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393, 402 (Pa. Super. 
1989)). As expressed in the pollution exclusion clause, the word 
sudden means-abrupt and unexpected. 
He reject Dimmltt'• suggestion that the policy is 
ambiguous because the term accident is Included both within the 
definition of occurrence and in the pollution 'exclusion 
provision. We concur with the response to this argument^stated 
Our conclusion that sudden has a temporal dimension when used 
in conjunction with the term accidental is consistent with this 
Court'8 precedent in construing the statutory definition of 
sudden accident in workers' compensation cases. Splyey v. 
Battaglla Fruit Co., 138 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1962); Meehan v. 
Crowder, 158 ria. 361, 28 So. 2d 435 (1946). 
Likewise, we also reject the dissenters' argument that the term 
"sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause should 
be given the same interpretation as certain courts have construed 
.10-
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in.United States Fidelity I Guaranty Co. v.- Star Fire Coals* 
Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988)i 
We do not find the pollution clause to be 
riddled with ambiguities despite the best 
efforts of Star Fire to create them. 
Specifically, we believe the district court 
erred when it treated the pollution exclusion 
and the "occurrence" definition provisions as 
interchangeable. Though the district court 
recognized that the issue before it was "whether 
Star Fire's release of coal dust falls within 
the policy exclusion provision," the court 
failed to explicate the language of the 
exclusion and ruled in favor of Star Fire on the 
basis of the "occurrence" definition. We have 
no difficulty reconciling the two provisions. 
We believe the "occurrence" definition results 
in a policy that provides coverage for 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions 
•causing damages in all cases except those 
involving pollution, where coverage is limited 
to those situations where the discharge was 
"sudden and accidental." We fully agree with 
the conclusion that this "language is clear and 
plain, something only a lawyer's Ingenuity could 
make ambiguous." American Motorists Insurance 
Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 r. Supp. 1423 (D. 
Kan. 1987). "It's strange logic to perceive 
the term in boiler and machinery policies. The most obvious flaw 
in this argument is that it ascribes universal meaning to^the 
phrase "sudden and accidental" regardless of the context of its 
use. Significantly, boiler and machinery policies provide 
coverage for damage that is sudden and accidental; Southeastern's 
pollution exclusion applies the phrase to the causative agent— 
the discharge. Further, we note that the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court specifically rejected its own prior decision in New gnaland 
Gas & Electric An'n v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., lift 
N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1953), the lead case relied upon by the 
dissenters, as authority for compelling the sudden and accidental 
language in pollution exclusion clauses to be construed in the 
same manner as in boiler and machinery policies. Lumbermens Mut. 
Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 
T990). 
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ambicuity" in this clause. Waste Management of 
Carolines, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co., 3l5' 
M.c. »S0/34u i.i.ldlU (1966). 
In the final analysis, we construe this policy to mean 
that (1) basic coverage arises from the occurrence of unintended 
damages, but (2) such damages as arise from the discharge of 
various pollutants are excluded from the basic coverage, except 
that (3) damages arising from the discharge of these pollutants 
will fall within the coverage of the policy where such discharge 
is sudden and accidental. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle 
Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 
78, 121 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1992). 
Because we conclude that the policy language is 
unambiguous, we find it inappropriate and unnecessary to consider 
the arguments pertaining to the drafting history of the pollution 
exclusion clause. 
Applying the policy language to the facts of this case, we 
hold that the pollution damage was not within the scope of 
Southeastern*s policy. The pollution took place over a period of 
many years and moat of it occurred gradually. With respect to 
the pollution which resulted from oil spills and leaks at the 
site as well as from occasional runoff of contaminated rain 
water, we agree with the analysis of the federal district judge 
in this case when he saidt 
These spills and leaks appear to be common 
place events which occurred in the course of 
daily business, and therefore cannot, as a 
•12-
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matter of law, be classified aa "sudden and 
accidental.• That is, theae "occasional 
accidental spills" are recurring events that 
took place in the usual course of recycling the 
oil. As one court observedi "contamination 
. . . by disposing of chemicals in the lagoon, 
or by annual careless spillage onto the ground 
surface cannot be sudden; or unexpected and 
accidental . . •" American Mutual Liability 
Ins. v, Neville Chemical, 650 F. Supp. 929, 933 
(W.P. Pa. 1987)1 Grant^Southern Iron* Metal Co. 
v. CNA Insurance Co., 469 F. Supp. 798 (B.D. 
Mich. 1986)(polluting air emissions caused by 
the sporadic or continuous break down of 
pollution equipment were not sudden and 
accidental). 
Industrial Indem. Ins. v. Crown Auto Dealerships. 731 F. Supp. 
1317, 1521 (M.D. Fia. 1990). See also Lumbermens Mut. Casualty 
Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc.. 555 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1990). 
We answer the certified question in the affirmative and 
return the record to the Eleventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
MCDONALD, SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., concur. 
GRIMES, J., concurs with an opinion. 
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BARKBTT, C.J. and 
HARDING, J., concur. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF 
FILED, DETERMINED. 
-13-
GRJJMES, j», concurring. 
I originally concurred with the position of the 
dissenters in this case. Z have now become convinced that I 
relied too much on what was said to be the drafting history of 
the pollution exclusion clauae and perhaps subconsciously upon 
the 'social premise that I would rather have insurance companies 
cover these losses rather than parties such as Dimmltt who did 
not actually cause the pollution damage. In so doing, I departed 
from the basic rule of interpretation that language should be 
given its plain and ordinary meaning. Try as I will, I cannot 
wrench the words "sudden and accidental" to mean "gradual and 
vaccidental," which must be done in order to provide coverage in 
this case. 
f 
r 
c 
i 
n 
c 
A 
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Overton, J., dissenting. 
t dissent. In my view, the majority! (1) ignores key 
factors in determining that the term "sudden and accidental,* as 
used in comprehensive liability insurance policies, is not 
ambiguous; (2) fails to consider the facts in this record 
concerning the Intent of the Insurance Industry in using that 
term and, consequently, is wrong on the merits; and (3) allows 
the insurance industry to grossly abuse the rehearing process in 
the presentation of its rehearing petition in this cause. 
The Definition of "Sudden and Accidental" 
The majority's reasoning blatantly ignores evidence before 
this Court reflecting that the term "sudden and accidental" is 
ambiguous. The term "sudden and accidental" has been in use by 
the Insurance industry in standard form insurance policies since 
before 1970. In those policies, "sudden and accidental* has been 
defined differently from the definition asserted in this case by 
Southeastern. For Instance, in policies involving boilers and 
machinery, courts have uniformly found the term "sudden and 
iccidental" to be defined as "unforeseen or unexpected" (the 
definition asserted by Olmmltt), aw opposed to "Instantaneous or 
ibrupt" (the definition asserted by Southeastern). The law is 
laar and unrefuted on this point. In explaining the meaning of 
See, s.g., New England Gas & Elec. Ass'n v. Ocean Accident & 
aarT Corp,, 116 N.E.2d 671, 680 (Mass. 1953)(defining the word 
sudden" within the terra "sudden and accidental" in a boiler and 
-15 
"sudden and accidental" in boiler and machinery policies, one 
treatise states the following; 
In order for the insured to recover under a 
boiler and machinery policy it must demonstrate 
that the occurrence was "sudden and accidental." 
Although the terms "sudden* and "accidental" 
seem to imply that the immediate or 
instantaneous event must occur, courts have 
construed these terms more broadly. Utilising 
the "common meaning" doctrine, the courts have 
uniformly held that the dictionary definition of 
the terms as "unforeseen, unexpected and 
unintentional" is controlling. 
Stephen A. Cozen, Insuring Real Property, | 5.03(2)(b) (1989) 
(footnotes omitted)* Similarly, Professor Couch in his treatise 
states the following! 
When coverage is limited to a sudden "breaking• 
of machinery the word "sudden" should be given 
its primary meaning as a happening without 
machinery policy as "a happening without previous notice or with 
very brief notice, or as something coming or occurring 
unexpectedly, unforeseen, or unprepared for"); Anderson fc 
Mlddleton Lumber Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 
938, 941 (Wash. 1959)^the word "sudden" within the term "sudden 
and accidental" in boiler and machinery policy, construed to mean 
"unforeseen and unexpected," not instantaneous"). See also 
Sutton Drilling Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 335 F. 2d~fTo7~Bl4 (5th 
Cir. 1944) (finding it was undisputed that the word "sudden," 4kB 
used in oil well Insurance policy, means "happening without 
previous notice or with very brief notice; unforeseen; rapid. 1: 
does not mean instantaneously."). After 1970, courts continued 
to similarly construe the term "sudden and accidental" in boiler 
and machinery policies. See, e.g., Community Fed. Sav. fc Loan 
Ass'n v* Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection t ins. Co., 580 
F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (CO...Mo. 1984) (three separate motor failures 
of one motor over a seven-month period found to be "sudden and 
accidental"); Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 931, 
934 (W.O. Pa. 1973) (relying on dictionary definition, court 
determined that "sudden" means "happening or coming 
unexpectedly"). 
-IS* 
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previous notice, or as something coming or 
occurring unexpectedly, as unforeseen or 
unprepared for. That lsf "sudden" is not to be 
construed as synonymous with Instantaneous. "~~ 
George J. Couch, 10A Couch on Ins* Law 2d f 42i396 (rev. ed. 
1982) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis, added). In fact, in one case 
three separate failures of one motor over a seven-month period 
ware found to be "sudden and accidental." Community Fed. Sav. ft 
Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection ft Ins. Co., 580 
p. Supp. 1170 (B.D. Mo. 1984). The simple fact that the tern 
"sudden and accidental" has been defined differently in other 
insurance policies is sufficient to support a finding of 
ambiguity as to the term's definition here. For the majority to 
assert otherwise/ in my view, defies logic and common sense and 
is legally unjustified. A majority of other state supreme courts 
that have considered this issue agree with my position. See 
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 
1991)i Claussen v. Aetna Casualty ft Sur. Co.. 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 
1989)i Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co,, 607 N.E.2d 
1204 (111. 1992)i Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 421 S.B.2d 493 (H. Va. 1992); Just v. Land Reclamation, 
Ltd., 456 M.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1990). 
In determining whether the term was ambiguous , the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that even dictionaries differ 
on the meaning of the term "sudden." That court noted that 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986) gives the 
primary meaning of "sudden" as "occurring unexpectedly .. • . not 
-17-
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foreseen," and a secondary meaning as "prompt," whereas, the 
Random House Dictionary gives the primary meaning as "happening, 
coming, made, or done quickly." 456 N.N.2d at 973. Random House 
gives "sudden" the secondary meaning of "an unexpected occasion 
or occurrence." The Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language (2d ed. 1987). 
The Georgia Supreme Court likewise noted the differences 
in the definition of that tern atid the variances of its primary 
and secondary meanings in the dictionaries, statingi "But, on 
reflection one realises that even in its popular usage, 'sudden' 
does not usually describe the duration of an event, but rather 
its unexpectednessi a sudden storm, a sudden turn in the road, 
sudden death." Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688. The court explained 
that "(e)ven when used to describe the onset of the event, the 
word has an elastic temporal connotation that varies with 
expectations." id• 
In my view, the term "sudden and accidental" must be found 
to be ambiguous given that the term is, in fact, subject to more 
than one interpretation. Although the insurance Industry asks 
that we find the term to be unambiguous, it is clear that the 
term can mean "unexpected and unintended," a definition not 
limited as to time of occurrence, in addition to Southeastern*s 
asserted definition of "Instantaneous or abrupt." This is 
especially true when considering the extreme divergence among the 
numerous jurisdictions considering this issue. As noted, even 
dictionaries cannot agree as to the primary and secondary 
.18-
meanings of the word "sudden.• Notably, however, perhaps the 
most important illustration of this ambiguity is the definition 
that the Insurance industry itself embraced in regulatory 
presentations. An examination of the pollution exclusion clause 
drafting history set forth below unquestionably supports the 
conclusion that the clause was Included only to preclude coverage 
for Intentionally caused pollution damage, not to preclude damage 
that was "unexpected and unintended." 
The Drafting History of Comprehensive General 
Liability Policies and the Pollution Exclusion Clause 
Comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies are 
standard Insurance policies developed by insurance Industry trade 
associations, and these policies are the primary form of 
commercial Insurance coverage obtained by businesses throughout 
the country. CGL policies have been revised in pertinent part on 
three separate occasionsi first in 1966, than again in the early 
1970s and mid-1980s.0 Just, 456 N.W.2d at 573-74; Brooke 
Jackson, Liability Insurance for Pollution Claimsi Avoiding a 
Litigation wasteland, 26 Tulsa L.J. 209, 224 (1990). The 
pollution exclusion clause, the clause at issue in this 
proceeding, was included as a standard clause in CGL policies in 
8
 In 1984 the industry proposed what has been called an "absolute 
pollution exclusion clause.1* The new clause completely 
eliminates the term "sudden and accidental" and totally excludes 
coverage for pollution clean-up costs that arise from 
governmental directives. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental 
Liability Insurance Law 161 (1991). 
19-
th* 1970s revision. Id^s Stephen L. Llebo, 7A Appleman's 
Insurance Law and Practice S 4499.05 (8upp. 1991). 
Before 1966, the standard comprehensive general liability 
policy covered only property and personal Injury damage that was 
caused by "accident." Broadwell Realty Serve., Inc. v. Fidelity 
4 Casualty Co. of New York, 528 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1987); Just, 456 N.H.2d at 574. The term "accident" was 
undefined in policies, and courts reached differing conclusions 
MB to' exactly what type of damage was covered. In defining the 
term "accident," most courts agreed that the term referred to 
damage caused by an unintentional or unexpected event. But some 
found that damage caused by gradual pollution was covered, while 
others did not. Just, 456 N.H.2d at 574. 
To clarify this confusion, in 1966 the insurance Industry 
switched from "accident-based" comprehensive general liability 
policies to "occurrence-based" policies. Kenneth S. Abraham, 
Environmental Liability Insurance Law 155 (1991). In the 
occurrence-baaed comprehensive general liability policy, the term 
"occurrence" was defined as "*an accident, including continuous 
or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily 
injury or property damage neither expected nor Intended from the 
standpoint of the insured.'" Broadwell, 528 A.2d at 84 (emphasis 
added)(quoting 3 Rowland H. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance 
App-53 (1966)). 
Statements by the Insurance industry at that time Indicate 
that the shift to an occurrence-based CGL policy was to "clarify 
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the, coverage provided by liability policies, and to avoid the 
confusion resulting from courts attempting to distinguish between 
accidental means and accidental results•• Grand River Lime Co. 
v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 289 N.B.2d 360, 364 (Ohio Ct. App*. 
1972). Additionally, the shift was to clearly indicate that the 
terri "occurrence" Included damages caused by "'exposure to 
conditions which may [have] continue[d] for an unmeasured period 
of time.'* Broadwell, 528 A.2d at 84 (quoting 3 Rowland H. Long, 
The Law of Liability Insurance APP-S3 (1966)). For instance, 
Lyman Baldwin, Secretary-Underwriting, Insurance Company of North 
America, made this statement regarding coverages 
"Let us consider how this would apply in a 
fairlyrcommonplace situation where we have a 
chemical manufacturing plant, which, during the 
course of its operations, emits noxious fumes 
that damage the paint on buildings in the 
surrounding neighborhood. Under the new 
(occurrence-based) policy, there is coverage 
until such time as the Insured becomes aware 
that the damage was being done." 
Just, 456 N.W.2d at 574 (quoting George Pendygraft, et al., Who 
Pays for Environmental Damaget Recent Developments In CERCLA 
Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 Ind. L. Rev. 117, 
141 (1988)). 
On March 17, 1970, the Industry again proposed to amend 
CGL policies to Include the pollution exclusion clause at issue 
ln
 Dlmmltt. When the pollution exclusion clause was proposed, 
representatives of the Industry indicated that the new clause was 
not designed to reduce coverage; instead, it was to ensure that 
insureds who recklessly and intentionally polluted or who failed 
S\ -21-
to.take reasonable precautions to prevent pollution would not be 
afforded coverage. For example, the Insurance Rating Board 
statedt 
"Coverage for pollution or contamination 
is not provided in most cases under present 
policies because damages can be said* to be 
expected or intended and thus are excluded by 
the definition of occurrence. The above 
exclusion clarifies this situation so as to 
avoid any question of Intent. Coverage is 
continued for pollution or contaminatiofiTcauaed 
injuries when the pollution or contamination 
results from an accident '. . . ." 
Just, -456 N.W.2d at 575 (emphasis added)(quoting James T. Price, 
Evidence Supporting Policyholders ln Insurance Coverage Disputes, 
Nat. Resources a Env't, Spring 1988, at 17, 48). Emphasising the 
view that it was not Intended to reduce coverage, The Flref 
Casualty a Surety Bulletin, a bulletin used by Insurance agents 
end brokers in interpreting policy provisions, statedi 
"In one important respect, the exclusion simply 
reinforces the definition of occurrence. That 
is, the policy states that it will not cover 
claims where the 'damage was expected or 
intended' by the Insured and the exclusion 
states, in effect, that the policy will cover 
incidents which are"sudden and accidental— 
unexpected and not intended." 
Just, 456 N.W.2d at 575 (emphasis added)(quoting Sheldon Hurwitz 
a Dan D. Kohane, The Love Canal—Insurance Coverage for 
Environmental Accidents. 50 Ins. Couns. J. 378, 379 (1983)). 
In determining whether to approve the new clause, the West] 
Virginia insurance commissioner held a hearing to determine the 
meaning of the term "sudden and accidental." The commissioner's 
concern was that the clause would reduce coverage but not reduce 
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rates. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer 
made the following findings! 
The [insurance] companies and rating 
organizations have represented to the Insurance 
Commissioner, orally and in writing, that the 
proposed exclusions . . « are merely 
clarifications of existing coverages as defined 
and limited in the definitions of the term 
'occurrence*, contained in the respective 
policies to which said exclusions would be 
attached. 
In re Pollution and Contamination Exclusion Findings. W. Va. 
Dept. of Xns. Order 70-4 (August 19, 1970)* The Supreme Court of 
west Virginia recently addressed the issue and stated the 
insurance industry had engaged "in studied, affirmative and 
official communications with a regulatory authority of the State 
of West Virginia.- Joy Technologies, 421 S.E.2d at 497. In 
those communications, 
the Insurance group representing (the Insurer in 
the case at issue] unambiguously and officially 
represented to the West Virginia Insurance 
Commission that the exclusion in question did 
not alter coverage under the policies involved, 
coverage which Included the injuries in the 
present case. This Court must conclude that the 
policies Issued by ftKe insurer] covered 
pollution damage, even If it resulted over a 
period of time and was gradual, so long as It 
was not expected or intended. 
Id. at 499-50 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Georgia in its decision noted that 
the insurance rating board made similar representations to its 
insurance commissioner by stating that the pollution exclusion 
clause was intended to shut out only intentional polluters. 
Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 689; Additionally, the board stated that 
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the clause's inclusion would have no effect on the vast majority 
of risks. Id. 
Likewise, the State of Florida, as an amicus curiae in 
this cause, hae asserted that representations similar to those 
made to West Virginia's insurance commissioner were made to it at 
the time the industry sought approval of the clause in Florida. 
The State additionally noted that, had insurers submitted the 
clause as one limiting coverage, Florida and other states would 
likely not have approved the clause without a simultaneous rate 
reduction. 
The drafting history of the pollution exclusion clause 
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the insurance Industry 
was attempting to exclude from coverage those polluters who 
committed their acts intentionally. The record of 
representations by the Insurance Industry itself clearly support 
this conclusion. The addition of the pollution exclusion clause, 
specifically tne term "sudden and accidental" was presented by 
the insurance industries to the regulators to <mean that coverage 
would continue for those events that were "unexpected and 
unintended*} the clause's purpose was simply to make clear that 
intentionally committed pollution would not be covered. 
Four state supreme courts have construed the term "sudden 
and accidental* to be clear and unambiguous, holding that the 
common, everyday understanding of the term "sudden" is a 
happening done quickly, without warning, unexpectedly, or 
abruptly. Lumbermena Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., 
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Inc., 533 N.B.2d 56B (Mass. 1990); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire 
Ins. Co., 476 M.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991); Waste Management, Inc. v. 
Peerless Ins. Co., 340 8.E.2d 374 (fl.C. 1986)| Hybud Equip. Corp. 
v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992). Hone of 
these courts, however, have addressed representations by the 
Industry regarding its intentions in Including the tern "sudden 
and accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause and none have 
acknowledged that the industry itself has construed and applied 
this term differently in other Insurance policies. In my view, 
the failure to consider these representations in determining the 
meaning of "sudden and accidental" is unjustified. I would hold 
that the insurance Industry contemplated no change in coverage 
except in those Instances where damage was caused by 
Intentionally committed acts of pollution, and, consequently, 
that "unexpected and unintentional" damage is covered under the 
term "sudden and accidental." 
Interestingly, even though the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
in Lumbermens held that "sudden and accidental,4 had a temporal 
meaning, its consideration of that term in a later case would 
still require that the summary judgment in the instant case be 
reversed and remanded. In Goodman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 593 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1992), the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
reviewed a case in which the damage at issue under the pollution 
exclusion clause was caused by a gradual leak. Damage caused as 
a result of the leak occurred over an eighteen-month period of 
time. The trial court, based on Lumbermens, had Issued summary 
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Judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that an eighteen-month 
leak was not "sudden and accidental." The Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded that determination, stating that the issue of 
whether the damage was sudden and accidental turned on how the 
accident itself occurred rather than whether the damage caused by 
t M accident was sudden and accidental. For instance, if the 
leak was caused by a sudden and accidental puncture, then the 
damage resulting from that leak was covered under the policy even 
if the damage Itself occurred over a long period to time. Under 
this rationale, it would still be necessary to remand the instant 
case for a determination of whether the damage at issue was 
sudden and accidental. 
Improper Grounds for Granting Rehearing 
Finally, I believe that the majority's opinion allows 
Southeastern to grossly abuse the rehearing process because the 
contents of the petition for rehearing in this case are improper. 
Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330, a motion for 
rehearing shall not be used to re-argue the merits of a court's 
decision. In this case not only does Southeastern totally 
reargue legal Issues previously considered by this Court, it also 
seeks to Improperly present "newly discovered evidence." 
See, for example, the Circuit Court of Appeals* notation that 
at least some of the damage at Issue was caused by a 1978 
incident in which a dike collapsed and allowed oily wastewater to 
be released from a holding pond. Crown Auto, 935 F.2d at 241. 
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Southaaatarn contanda that its "new" avidanca ia admiaaibia to 
rebut axtrinaic avidanca tubmittad by Oimmitt. 
I would strike Southeastern'* "new avidanca" for two 
reasons. First, the evidence submitted by Oimmitt was properly 
made part of the record in this proceeding. The Circuit Court 
for .the Eleventh Circuit specifically noted that the record in 
this case properly included extrinsic evidence submitted by 
Dlmmltt Chevrolet regarding the drafting history of the pollution 
exclusion clause and the intent of the insurance companies. It 
further noted that Southeastern had an opportunity to respond to 
the evidence submitted by Oimmitt* It statedt 
We conclude that the record properly 
includes the extrinsic evidence submitted by 
Dlmmltt regarding the drafting history of the 
pollution exclusion clause and the intent of 
the Insurance companies. Appellee argues that 
such extrinsic evidence is not properly a part 
of the record on appeal because much of it was 
proffered with the post-trial motion to alter 
or amend and was thus untimely. Under the 
circuits tancea of this case, it waa appropriate 
for Oimmitt to proffer the evidence in 
connection with the motion to alter or amend. 
The district court ruled that the .evidence was 
discoverable in a February 8, 1990 order* The 
parties' pretrial stipulation contemplated that 
the issue of admissibility of the evidence 
would be decided at a motion In limine. 
However, the district court granted summary 
judgment prior to the date set for trial. 
Dlmmltt reasonably planned to argue for 
admissibility of the evidence at a motion ir\ 
limine, rather than in a supplemental briet in 
connection with the pending summary judgment 
motions, because the district court's 
February 8, 1990 order denied motions by 
certain other auto dealerships to file 
supplemental briefs in support of their cross-
motions for summary judgment. Furthermore, 
Southeastern had an opportunity to respond to 
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the extrinsic evidence, and in fact did 
respond, in their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
Finally, at least some of the evidence was 
discussed in opinions cited by the district 
court in its order granting summary judgment. 
See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Caa. 6 Sur. Co., 
5?5 GaT333, 390 £.E.2d 595 (1959)'. 
Industrial Indem. Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 935 
F.2d 240, 243 n.3. (11th Cir. 1991)(references to record 
omitted). Consequently, the extrinsic evidence submitted by 
Oimmitt may properly be considered by this Court. 
Second, the evidence Southeastern now asks this Court to 
consider is not new—it is a drafting and regulatory history of 
the policy at issue aa compiled by Transamerlca Insurance 
Company. Transamerlca sought to file this history in an amicus 
brief in this proceeding. However, the brief was late-filed and 
was rejected by this Court* Southeastern now soaks to admit 
Transamerlca's compilation by incorporating that compilation into 
ita rehearing petition, claiming it la "new evidence." This 
history was readily available to Southeastern during the course 
of this proceeding/ and it is improper to allow them to 
circumvent procedural rules of this Court by permitting 
submission of that evidence at this time. 
Given that the evidence being submitted by Southeastern is 
now inadmissible and given that a significant portion of 
Southeastern's argument in the petition makes reference to that 
evidence, I believe that the rehearing petition is improper under 
the rules and should be stricken. Consideration of the rehearing 
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petition in its present font makes a mockery of the rehearing 
rule and effectively signals the bar. that "anything goes." 
Apparently, the insurance industry has sought a proverbial second 
bite at the apple and won* 
BARKETT, C.J. and HARDING, J., concur. 
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